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ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR.
 1
   United States Attorney
   DENNISE D. WILLETT
   Assistant United States Attorney
3
   Chief, Santa Ana Section
   ROBERT J. KEENAN (Bar No. 151094)
4
   Assistant United States Attorney
   U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
   411 West Fourth Street
   Suite 8000
   Santa Ana, California 92701
   Telephone: (714) 338-3597
   Facsimile: (714) 338-3708
   E-Mail:
               Rob.Keenan@usdoj.gov
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   Attorneys for Plaintiff
   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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                      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                     CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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                            SOUTHERN DIVISION
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                                ) Case No. SA CR 10-0028-JVS
   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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                   Plaintiff,
                                     PLEA AGREEMENT
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                                      [18 U.S.C. § 1424]
             v.
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                                      [18 U.S.C. § 1425]
                                      [18 U.S.C. § 1524]
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   CONCETTA VASQUEZ,
                                      [42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(6)]
    aka "Jane Doe,"
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    aka Michelle Llacuna,
    aka Michelle L. Anunciacion,)
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                  Defendant.
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24
             This constitutes the plea agreement between defendant
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   CONCETTA VASQUEZ ("defendant"), who has previously been
   identified in this case as "Jane Doe" and who has used the names
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   "Michelle Augustine Llacuna" and "Michelle L. Anunciacion," and
28
   the United States Attorney's Office for the Central District of
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Date: August 6, 2010 v.2

California ("the USAO") in the above-captioned case. This Agreement is limited to the USAO and cannot bind any other federal, state, or local prosecuting, administrative, or regulatory authorities.

GUILTY PLEAS

2. Defendant agrees to plead guilty to all four counts of the four-count indictment on file in the above-captioned case,

<u>United States v. Jane Doe, a/k/a "Michelle L. Anunciacion</u>," Case

No. SA CR 10-0028-JVS. Defendant admits that she is, in fact,

guilty of the offenses as described in counts one through four of the indictment.

NATURE OF THE OFFENSES

- 3. In order for defendant to be guilty of count one of the indictment, which charges a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1424, the following must be true: (1) defendant was an applicant in a naturalization or citizenship proceeding; and (2) defendant, as such applicant, knowingly personated another or appeared falsely in an assumed or fictitious name.
- 4. In order for defendant to be guilty of count two of the indictment, which charges a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425, the following must be true: (1) defendant procured naturalization; (2) defendant procured naturalization knowingly; (3) defendant was not entitled to naturalization; and (4) defendant knew that she was not entitled to naturalization, or knew that she was making misrepresentations on her naturalization petition or in her naturalization interview or both.
- 5. In order for defendant to be guilty of count three of the indictment, which charges a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542,

the following must be true: (1) defendant willfully and knowingly made a false statement in an application for a United States passport; and (2) defendant did so with the intent to induce and or secure issuance of a passport for her own use or the use of another.

6. In order for defendant to be guilty of count four of the indictment, which charges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(6), the following must be true: (1) defendant willfully and knowingly furnished false information to the Social Security Administration ("SSA"); and (2) defendant did so with the intent to deceive the SSA as to her true identity.

PENALTIES

7. The statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1424 is as follows: 5 years imprisonment; a fine of \$250,000; a 3-year period of supervised release; and a mandatory special assessment of \$100. statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425 is as follows: 10 years imprisonment; a fine of \$250,000; a 3-year period of supervised release; and a mandatory special assessment of \$100. statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542 is as follows: 10 years imprisonment; a fine of \$250,000; a 3-year period of supervised release; and a mandatory special assessment of \$100. statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(6) is as follows: 5 years imprisonment; a fine of \$250,000; a 3-year period of supervised release; and a mandatory special assessment of \$100. Therefore,

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the total maximum sentence for the offenses to which defendant is pleading guilty is as follows: 30 years imprisonment; a fine of \$1,000,000; a 3-year period of supervised release; and a mandatory special assessment of \$400.

- 8. Supervised release is a period of time following imprisonment during which defendant will be subject to various restrictions and requirements. If defendant violates one or more of the conditions of any supervised release imposed, he may be returned to prison for all or part of the term of supervised release, which could result in defendant serving a total term of imprisonment greater than the statutory maximum stated above.
- 9. If defendant is presently on probation, parole, or supervised release in another case, a conviction in this case may cause the court or parole authorities responsible for any such other case to revoke defendant's probation, parole, or supervised release.
- 10. A conviction in this case may have collateral consequences that the Court has no power to control, and unanticipated collateral consequences will not serve as grounds for a defendant to later withdraw a guilty plea. A conviction in this case may cause defendant to lose certain civic rights or benefits, such as the right to vote, the right to possess a firearm, the right to hold office, the right to serve on a jury, and the revocation of a professional license. Moreover, because defendant's guilty pleas will admit that she obtained naturalization as a U.S. Citizen through fraud and under false pretenses, a conviction in this case will cause defendant to be denaturalized (i.e., have her status as a U.S. Citizen revoked)

and may subject defendant to deportation or removal from the United States (which may be mandatory, in some cases) or otherwise affect defendant's immigration status.

FACTUAL BASIS

- 11. Defendant and the USAO agree and stipulate to the following statement of facts, which defendant concedes could be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt at trial:
 - (a) On February 23, 2000, defendant was an applicant in a naturalization and citizenship proceeding. As such, she knowingly personated another and appeared falsely in an assumed and fictitious name, specifically, the name of "Michelle Augustin Llacuna," in connection with a naturalization ceremony and other proceedings on defendant's application to become a naturalized United States citizen.
 - (b) On February 23, 2000, defendant knowingly procured for herself, contrary to law, naturalization as a United States citizen and documentary and other evidence of such naturalization, to which she was not entitled. Specifically, defendant knowingly procured naturalization for herself, contrary to law, by making material false statements in connection with her application for naturalization, including statements (a) that her name was "Michelle Augustin Llacuna";
 - (b) that certain information accurately specified the names of her parents, her date of birth, and her place of birth; and (c) that defendant had never given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining an immigration

benefit.

In truth, as defendant well knew,

(a) "Michelle Augustin Llacuna" was not her true name;

- (b) the information regarding the names of defendant's parents, defendant's date of birth, and defendant's place of birth were all untrue; and (c) defendant had given false testimony to obtain an immigration benefit to which she was not entitled, including false sworn statements regarding her name and other identifying information in support of her application for an immigrant visa and alien registration (by which she fraudulently obtained admission into the United States and issuance of a permanent resident alien card), and her application for naturalization and related proceedings. Defendant also procured her naturalization as a United States citizen contrary to law, and to which she was not entitled, because she had obtained her permanent residency status by fraud.
- knowingly made a false statement in an application for a United States passport. She did so with the intent to induce and secure for her own use the issuance of a passport under the authority of the United States, contrary to the laws regulating the issuance of such passports and the rules prescribed pursuant to such laws, in that, in such application, defendant stated that her name was "Michelle Augustin Llacuna" and provided other information regarding the names of her parents, her date of birth, and her place of birth. In

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truth and fact, as defendant knew, her name was not "Michelle Augustin Llacuna" and her other identifying information was also false.

- (d) On July 20, 2007, defendant, with intent to deceive the Commissioner of Social Security as to her true identity, knowingly and willfully furnished and caused to be furnished false information to the Commissioner of Social Security with respect to information required by the Commissioner of Social Security in connection with the establishment and maintenance of the records provided for in Title 42, United States Code, Section 405(c)(2), in that, in an application for a replacement Social Security Card, defendant knowingly and willfully made false statements as to her name, the names of her parents, her date of birth, and her place of birth.
- (e) After her naturalization, defendant did not make a false claim to U.S. citizenship, although it was procured by a false statement.

WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

- 12. Defendant understands that, if she pleads guilty, there will be no trial. By pleading guilty, defendant understands that she is giving up all of the following rights, which she agrees to waive at the change of plea hearing:
 - (a) The right to persist in a plea of not guilty;
 - (b) The right to a speedy and public trial by jury;
 - (c) The right to the assistance of counsel at trial, including, if defendant could not afford an

attorney, the right to have the Court appoint one for defendant;

- (d) The right to be presumed innocent and to have the burden of proof placed on the Government to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt;
- (e) The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against defendant;
- (f) The right, if defendant wished, to testify on her own behalf and present evidence in opposition to the charges, including the right to call witnesses and to subpoena those witnesses to testify; and
- (g) The right not to be compelled to testify, and, if defendant chose not to testify or present evidence, to have that choice not be used against defendant.
- 13. By pleading guilty, defendant also gives up any and all rights to pursue any affirmative defenses, Fourth Amendment or Fifth Amendment claims, and other pretrial motions that have been filed or could be filed (e.g., motions to suppress evidence or dismiss the indictment on any ground).

SENTENCING FACTORS

14. In determining defendant's sentence, the Court is required to consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7), including the sentencing range established under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant understands that the Sentencing Guidelines are only advisory and not binding on the Court under <u>United States v. Booker</u>, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Defendant thus understands that, after "considering"

the Sentencing Guidelines and the other § 3553(a) factors, the Court is free to exercise its discretion to impose any sentence up to the maximum set by statute for the crimes of conviction.

- Agreement, the terms "depart," "departure," "adjust,"
 "adjustment," and "specific offense characteristics" shall have
 the same meaning as in the Sentencing Guidelines. The terms
 "vary" and "variance" mean any decision by the Court under
 Booker, on whatever grounds, to impose a sentence that is above
 or below the determined Guidelines' sentencing range. "Total
 Adjusted Offense Level" means the offense level calculated by the
 Court based on consideration of all special offense
 characteristics and Chapter 3 or 4 adjustments, but before
 considering whether to grant any departure or variance.
- 16. Defendant and the USAO agree and stipulate to the following applicable sentencing guideline factors, based on the November 1, 2005 Guideline Manual:

COUNT ONE: False Personation in Naturalization Proceeding

Base Offense Level 8 U.S.S.G. § 2L2.2(a)

Specific Offense Characteristics

Defendant fraudulently obtained a United States passport:

+4 U.S.S.G. § 2L2.2(b)(3)(A)

SUB-TOTAL: 12

COINT TWO IID SWEDT DECEN		
COONT TWO: UNITAWILLI PIOCUL	rement	of Naturalization
Base Offense Level	_8_	U.S.S.G. § 2L2.2(a)
Specific Offense		
<u>Characteristics</u>		
Defendant fraudulently obtained a United States		
passport:	<u>+4</u>	U.S.S.G. § 2L2.2(b)(3)(A
SUB-TOTAL:	12	
COUNT THREE: False Stateme	nt in	Passport Application
Base Offense Level	_8_	U.S.S.G. § 2L2.2(a)
pecific Offense haracteristics		
Defendant fraudulently		
obtained a United States passport:	<u>+4</u>	U.S.S.G. § 2L2.2(b)(3)(A
SUB-TOTAL:	12	
COUNT FOUR: Furnishing Fal	se Inf	Formation to Social Securi
Base Offense Level	_8_	U.S.S.G. § 2L2.2(a)
<u>Specific Offense</u> <u>Characteristics</u>		
Defendant fraudulently		
obtained a United States passport:	<u>+4</u>	U.S.S.G. § 2L2.2(b)(3)(A
SUB-TOTAL:	12	
CHAPTER 3 ADJUSTMENTS		
Highest Count-Specific		
Sub-Total (from above):	<u>12</u>	
Grouping of counts No additional increase:	_0	U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b)
Acceptance of Responsibility:	<u>-2</u>	U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1

Defendant and the USAO agree to not argue for application of any other specific offense characteristic or adjustment. Defendant reserves the right to argue for a downward departure under the Guidelines, and she reserves the right under <u>Booker</u> to argue for a downward "variance," that is, any sentence that she believes to be fair and reasonable. The USAO reserves the right to make all arguments in opposition to a defense motion for, or USPO recommendation of, a downward departure or variance. The USAO agrees to make no motion for an upward departure or upward variance.

- 17. There is no agreement as to defendant's criminal history or criminal history category.
- 18. The stipulations in this Agreement do not bind either the United States Probation Office or the Court. The Court will determine the facts and calculations relevant to sentencing.

 Both defendant and the USAO are free to: (a) supplement the facts stipulated to in this Agreement by supplying relevant information to the United States Probation Office and the Court, (b) correct any and all factual misstatements relating to the calculation of the sentence, and (c) argue on appeal and collateral review that the Court's sentencing calculations are not error; provided, however, that each party agrees to maintain its view that each and every fact set forth in Paragraph 11's statement of Factual Basis are true and correct and that the Sentencing Guideline stipulations in Paragraph 16 are consistent with the facts of this case.

DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATIONS

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of the following things:

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- 19. Pursuant to this Agreement, defendant agrees to do all
 - (a) To plead quilty as set forth in this Agreement and not thereafter move to withdraw her guilty pleas.
 - To waive, without reservation, all of the rights referenced in Paragraphs 12 and 13 of this Agreement.
 - (c) To not knowingly and willfully fail to abide by all sentencing stipulations contained in this Agreement.
 - To not knowingly and willfully fail to (i) appear as ordered for all court appearances, (ii) surrender as ordered for service of sentence, (iii) obey all conditions of any bond, and (iv) obey any other ongoing court order in this matter.
 - Not to commit any crime; however, offenses which would be excluded for sentencing purposes under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(2) (e.g., traffic infractions) are not within the scope of this Agreement.
 - To not knowingly and willfully fail to be truthful at all times with Pretrial Services, the U.S. Probation Office, and the Court.
 - To pay the applicable special assessments at or before the time of sentencing, unless defendant lacks the ability to pay.

Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), defendant stipulates to the entry of an order revoking her citizenship and cancelling the Certificate of Naturalization, Number 25515737, because she illegally procured her United States citizenship in the manner detailed in the indictment and Paragraph 11 of this The Proposed Order Revoking Citizenship is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Upon entry of the Order Revoking Citizenship, defendant agrees to immediately surrender her Certificate of Naturalization, Number 25515737, any copies thereof in her possession, along with any other indicia of United States citizenship in defendant's name or any other alias name (e.g., U.S. Passport) to the Attorney General of the Department of Justice, or one of his representatives. Defendant understands that upon entry of the Order Revoking Citizenship, she will not be legally able to claim any rights, privileges, or advantages from her revoked United States citizenship obtained as a result of her February 23, 2000 naturalization and that doing so will subject her to possible criminal and civil penalties. Defendant agrees that neither she nor her heirs or assigns will challenge her denaturalization by any means, including but not limited to, any appeal (whether administrative or judicial), any collateral attack, or any application for injunctive action, or equitable relief. Defendant understands and agrees that upon entry of an order revoking her United States

citizenship, she will revert to her former status as a Lawful Permanent Resident and she may be subject to the institution of removal proceedings, as a deportable alien, under section 237 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1227, or any future INA provision defining classes of deportable aliens, based on defendant's convictions in this case.

USAO'S OBLIGATIONS

- 20. If defendant complies fully with all of her obligations under this Agreement, the USAO agrees to do the following:
 - (a) To abide by all sentencing stipulations contained in this Agreement.
 - (b) At the time of sentencing, provided that defendant demonstrates an acceptance of responsibility for the offense up to and including the time of sentencing, to recommend a two-level reduction in the applicable sentencing guideline offense level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and an additional one-level reduction if available under that section.

satisfied by imprisonment, not home detention or in a community confinement center. If, for any reason, the Court determines defendant's Total Adjusted Offense Level is higher than 10, the USAO agrees to argue for a downward Booker variance for a term of imprisonment that is at the low-end of the sentencing range applicable to Level 10.

BREACH OF AGREEMENT

21. If, at any time between the execution of this
Agreement and her sentencing, defendant knowingly violates or
fails to perform any of her obligations under this Agreement ("a
breach"), the USAO may declare defendant to be in breach of this
Agreement. If the USAO declares this Agreement breached, and the
Court finds such a breach to have occurred, defendant will not be
able to withdraw her guilty pleas, but the USAO will be relieved
of all of its obligations under this Agreement.

WAIVERS OF APPEAL AND COLLATERAL ATTACK

22. Defendant waives and gives up the right to appeal her conviction on all counts to which she pleads guilty. Defendant also waives and gives up the right to appeal any term of imprisonment imposed by the Court, and the manner in which the sentence is determined, provided that the following conditions are satisfied: (a) the prison term is within the statutory maximum specified above; (b) the Court determines that the Total Adjusted Offense Level is 10 or below; (c) the Court does not depart upward from the Total Adjusted Offense Level or Criminal History Category; and (d) the Court imposes a sentence within or below the Guidelines sentencing range that corresponds to the

determined Total Adjusted Offense Level and Criminal History
Category. Defendant also waives and gives up the right to appeal
(a) any standard condition of supervised release set forth in the
Court's General Orders 318 and 01-05; (b) the drug/alcohol use
and testing conditions mandated by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a)(5),(b)(7)
and 3583(d); and (c) any special condition to which defendant
does not object at or before sentencing.

- 23. Defendant waives and gives up any right to bring a post-conviction collateral attack on her conviction and sentence, except a post-conviction collateral attack based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a claim of newly discovered evidence, or a retroactive change in the applicable Sentencing Guidelines, sentencing statutes, or statutes of conviction.
- 24. The USAO gives up its right to appeal the sentence, provided the following conditions are satisfied: (a) the Court determines that the Total Adjusted Offense Level is 10 or above; (b) the Court, in determining the applicable guideline range, does not depart downward from the Total Adjusted Offense Level or criminal history category; and (c) the Court imposes a sentence within or above the range corresponding to the determined Total Adjusted Offense Level and Criminal History Category.

COURT NOT A PARTY TO AGREEMENT

25. The Court is not a party to this Agreement and need not accept any of its stipulations or the USAO's sentencing recommendations. Even if the Court ignores any sentencing recommendation, finds facts or reaches conclusions different from any stipulation, and/or imposes any sentence up to the maximum

established by statute, defendant cannot, for that reason, withdraw her guilty pleas, and defendant will remain bound to fulfill all of her obligations under this Agreement. No one -- not the prosecutor, defendant's attorney, or the Court -- can make a binding prediction or promise regarding the sentence defendant will receive, except that it will be within the statutory maximum.

SCOPE OF AGREEMENT

26. This Agreement applies only to those crimes charged in the pending indictment and the disposition thereof, as well as the denaturalization of defendant's status as a U.S. citizen. This Agreement has no effect on any other crimes not charged in the pending indictment. This Agreement shall not preclude or have any other effect on any motions or orders in this case that are collateral to defendant's change of plea or sentencing or on any other separate proceedings against defendant not mentioned expressly herein, including any past, present, or future forfeiture actions.

NO OTHER AGREEMENTS

27. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between defendant and the USAO. Except as set forth herein, there are no promises, understandings, or agreements, written or oral, express or implied, between the USAO and defendant or defendant's counsel. Nor may any additional agreement, understanding, or condition, including any modification of this Agreement, be entered into except by (1) a writing signed by all parties or (2) by an oral modification that is expressly identified on the

record as an intended modification of this Agreement and that is subscribed to expressly by all parties on the record in court.

AGREEMENT PART OF GUILTY PLEA HEARING

28. This Agreement shall be considered part of the record of defendant's guilty plea hearing as if the entire Agreement had been read into the record of the proceeding.

EFFECTIVE DATE

29. This Agreement is effective upon signature by defendant, her counsel, and an Assistant United States Attorney.

AGREED AND ACCEPTED:

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR. United States Attorney

ROBERT J. KEENAN

Assistant United States Attorney

August 12, 2010.

AGREED AND ACCEPTED BY DEFENDANT:

I have read this Agreement in its entirety, and I have thoroughly discussed every part of it with my attorney. I have had enough time to review and consider the Agreement. I understand the terms of this Agreement, and I freely and voluntarily agree to those terms.

I have had a satisfactory opportunity to talk with my attorney about the evidence against me. My attorney has advised me of my rights, of possible defenses, of the Sentencing Guideline provisions, and of the consequences of entering into

this Agreement. I am satisfied with my attorney's representation of me in this matter.

No promises, inducements, or representations of any kind have been made to me by anyone (including the prosecutor, agents, or my attorney) other than those contained in this Agreement. In particular and without limitation, no one has told me that I will receive any particular sentence or a sentence within any particular range, except that my sentence will not exceed the statutory maximum permitted by law. No one has threatened me or used force against me, or persons close to me, in any way to get me to enter into this Agreement. I am agreeing to plead guilty because I am guilty as charged, not for any other reason.

I understand the consequences of pleading guilty. Among other things, I understand that, if I plead guilty in Court in accordance with this Agreement, there will be no trial, the government will be relieved of its burden of proving me guilty, and there will be nothing left for the Court to do but sentence me. There will be no trial because I will be convicted based on my own admission of guilt.

CONCETTA VASQUEZO Defendant

8 18 10 Date

DEFENSE COUNSEL'S CERTIFICATION:

I am the attorney for CONCETTA VASQUEZ, the defendant in this case, who has thus far been referred to in this case as JANE DOE a/k/a "Michelle Llacuna" and "Michelle L. Anunciacion." I have carefully discussed every part of this Agreement with my

I have fully advised my client of her rights, of possible defenses, of the Sentencing Guidelines' provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this Agreement. knowledge, my client's decision to enter into this Agreement is an informed and voluntary one. I have made no promises or representations to my client that she will receive any particular sentence or a sentence within any particular range, except that the sentence will not exceed the statutory maximum sentence permitted by law, nor any promises contrary to the advisements contained in this Agreement.

Counsel for Defendant

Date: August 6, 2010 v.2

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ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR.
 1
    United States Attorney
    DENNISE D. WILLETT
    Assistant United States Attorney
    Chief, Santa Ana Section
    ROBERT J. KEENAN (Bar No. 151094)
 4
    Assistant United States Attorney
    U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
    411 West Fourth Street
    Suite 8000
 6
    Santa Ana, California 92701
    Telephone:
               (714) 338-3597
    Facsimile:
                 (714) 338-3708
    E-Mail:
                Rob.Keenan@usdoj.gov
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    Attorneys for Plaintiff
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    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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                       UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                      CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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                             SOUTHERN DIVISION
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                                       Case No. SA CR 10-0028-JVS
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
16
                                       [PROPOSED] ORDER REVOKING
                   Plaintiff,
                                       CITIZENSHIP
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   CONCETTA VASQUEZ,
     aka Michelle Llacuna,
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     aka Michelle L. Anunciacion,
21
                   Defendant.
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23
         Defendant CONCETTA VASQUEZ, previously referred to in the
   above-captioned case as "JANE DOE," and who has used the names
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   "Michelle Augustine Llacuna" and "Michelle Llacuna Anunciacion,"
26
   having admitted to procuring her naturalization as a U.S. Citizen
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under a false personation and through related false statements in

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violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1424 and 1425, including in her

Date: August 6, 2010 v.2

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Application for Naturalization and Sworn Statement related to the Oath Ceremony, and consenting to an order revoking citizenship in her name:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the naturalization of defendant ordered by the Attorney General of the United States admitting defendant to United States citizenship on February 23, 2000 is revoked and set aside, and the Certificate of Naturalization No. 25515737 is cancelled.

Order, is forever restrained and enjoined from claiming any rights, privileges, or advantages under any document that evidences United States citizenship in her true name, CONCETTA VASOUEZ, or the false name and personation that she used to obtain U.S. citizenship, "Michelle Augustine Llacuna," or the derivative married name that she has used most recently, "Michelle Llacuna Anunciacion."

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT defendant surrender and deliver the Certificate of Naturalization, No. 25515737, and any copies thereof in her possession (and to make good faith efforts to recover and then surrender any copies thereof that she knows are in possession of others) to the Attorney General or authorized representatives of the U.S. Department of Justice immediately; and return any other indicia of United States citizenship and any copies thereof in her possession (and to make good faith efforts to recover and then surrender any copies thereof that she knows are in possession of others), including, but not limited to, any

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1	United States passport, voter registration card, and other voting
2	documents issued to defendant.
3	IT IS SO ORDERED.
4	Dated: August, 2010.
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6	JAMES V. SELNA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
7	
8	Respectfully submitted:
9	ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR. United States Attorney
10	DENNISE D. WILLETT
11	Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Santa Ana Section
12	Clifer, Salica Alia Seccioli
13	/s/ R.J.K. ROBERT J. KEENAN
14	Attorneys for Plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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Date: August 6, 2010 v.2

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